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China’s impressive economic growth and increasing development activities 
overseas, particularly in the African continent, have spurred intense debate and 
criticism over its role as a rising power in international development. China is 
viewed in the West both as a threat, but also as a valuable potential partner in 
development cooperation. However, differences between Western and Chinese 
conceptions of foreign aid and development have complicated cooperation and 
understanding of China’s development and aid structures. Further knowledge 
of these differences is needed, in order to evaluate their implications for 
low-income countries, and for potential trilateral cooperation. 
“China is viewed 
in the West 
both as a 
threat, but also 
as a valuable 
potential 
partner in 
development 
cooperation.”
 Understanding China’s 
 Approaches to International 
 Development
China’s growing overseas development 
activities have garnered international 
attention, as well as strong criticism 
due to its resource extraction activities 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and its non-
interference in these states. China’s 
current development cooperation in 
Africa and elsewhere draws upon a history 
of evolving aid and diplomatic relations 
with Southern states, and China’s current 
discourse remains consistent with Zhou 
Enlai’s foreign policy principles dating 
back to the 1950s, which emphasised 
sovereignty, horizontality and non-
interference between developing states.  
‘Mutual benefit’ is a core principle in 
China’s aid and foreign policy, through 
which it helps build up the partner 
country’s capacity for independent 
‘self-development’. This stands in 
contrast to principles of untied aid in 
the OECD-DAC model, but forms a 
central principle in its 2006 ‘China’s 
African Policy’, and in its 2014 White 
Paper on Foreign Aid, which endorsed 
notions of non-conditionality, equality 
and self-development. In practice, 
non-interference and non-intervention 
are becoming increasingly tested on 
the ground – most notably in the case 
of the Sudanese crisis in 2007, where 
international pressure forced China to 
offer military support, and this may be 
a growing trend as China’s economic 
investments in the continent grow.  
While current Western development 
aid focuses strongly on notions of 
poverty reduction, social welfare, and 
political and institutional reform, Chinese 
development cooperation forms a much 
broader remit that emphasises economic 
relationships. Chinese discourse rarely 
refers to aid and development together, 
and views both as separate concepts. 
In fact, the White Paper and official 
discourse describes China as a developing 
country, rejecting the status of China 
as a donor, and arguing that it cannot 
provide development aid. Instead, its 
relationship with developing countries is 
framed as one of a horizontal and equal 
partnership for common development.
China’s development cooperation 
entails a broad model of 
economic engagement
Aid, or development assistance in the 
traditional sense, forms a small element 
of China’s development cooperation, 
which entails a much broader model of 
economic engagement that includes 
significant trade, loans and capital 
investments. Official definitions and 
statistics around China’s foreign aid 
remain vague and are often classified, and the 
practical and experimental nature of Chinese 
development assistance means there is little 
articulation of a model for China’s development 
cooperation. The 2014 White Paper lists 
technical cooperation, debt relief and projects as 
major forms of aid. Of these foreign assistance 
projects, a majority is spent on economic 
infrastructure, followed by industry, energy and 
resource development, and agriculture. Grants, 
concessionary loans, and assistance for joint 
ventures are the primary forms of financing, 
which are used in concert with its investment 
and trade policies in order to leverage greater 
investment from the commercial sector. 
 
At the same time, China has extended 
preferential tariffs on exports from 29 least-
developed African countries, and two-way 
trade between China and Africa increased to 
over US$166bn in 2012, making China Africa’s 
largest trade partner. China has also become 
a major source of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to Africa. This surge in the China–Africa 
relationship has generated an intense debate 
on what the main drivers of China’s interest in 
Africa are and the impacts that this growing 
relationship is having on African countries.
Multiple ministries and agencies 
support delivery and implementation 
of China’s development cooperation 
China’s development cooperation involves a 
number of government agencies, primarily 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), as 
well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), though 
other central and local government agencies, 
the Exim Bank, as well as public and private 
enterprises, and institutions are also involved in 
delivery and implementation. MOFCOM is the 
lead agency in managing economic policies and 
foreign aid, under which two new sub-divisions, 
the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries 
(DAFC) and the Department of International 
Cooperation, are responsible for outward and 
inward flows of aid, respectively. Under the 
DAFC, the Executive Bureau of International 
Economic Cooperation (EBIEC) was established 
in 2009 to execute and implement DAFC 
policies, and manage cooperation with 
traditional donors, but DAFC remains relatively 
small, comprising no more than 100 personnel, 
of which 20–30 work mainly on Africa. 
Major decisions on aid are determined at the 
central level, after which policies, funding 
allocation and project planning are directed 
primarily by MOFCOM, in consultation with 
MOFA and MOF. The project selection process 
begins by recipient governments and Chinese 
embassies articulating their requirements, 
which narrows down the needs, and they then 
pass project requests to MOFCOM. MOFCOM 
then commissions a field investigation for 
the project. Following consultation between 
MOFCOM and other relevant departments, 
the project request is passed through the State 
Council for approval. MOF then allocates funds 
to MOFCOM, which either opens a bidding 
procedure to contract the project or provides 
funds to the relevant department. EBIEC 
under MOFCOM then assumes responsibility 
for project oversight and implementation.
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Concessional loans in China’s development assistance 
While MOFCOM provides grants and interest-free loans for aid projects, policy banks, 
such as the Exim Bank and China Development Bank, have been set up to work with 
concessional loans. Provision of ‘interest-subsidy’ concessional loans in the late 1990s form 
perhaps the most fundamental change in China’s development cooperation since 1978. 
After the late 1970s, China dramatically reduced the scale of its foreign assistance, mainly 
supporting medium- or small-scale aid projects until it began using concessional loans to 
fund large-scale projects. The Exim Bank in particular, manages large-scale development 
projects and has been heavily involved in Chinese infrastructural investment in Africa. 
One key feature of China–Africa engagement is the use of resource-for-equity swaps, 
typified in the ‘Angola-model’, where loans are repaid through oil and other extractive 
commodities. While criticised as an unequal power relationship, these government-
subsidised loans offer attractive rates below market price, and have been a valuable source 
of funding for large-scale infrastructure in the African region, allowing countries that are 
capital poor but resource-rich to develop and grow their extractive sectors.
“While current 
Western 
development aid 
focuses strongly 
on notions of 
poverty reduction, 
social welfare, 
and political and 
institutional 
reform, Chinese 
development 
cooperation 
forms a much 
broader remit 
that emphasises 
economic 
relationships.”
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The role of state and businesses in 
development cooperation
China’s business sector has become increasingly 
involved in development projects, fuelled in 
part by its ‘Going Global’ strategy initiated 
in 2000. This policy used state incentives, 
including preferential trade regulations, low 
interest loans and Exim Bank support, in order 
to promote the outward investment and 
global expansion of China’s leading firms and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
The engagement of SOEs in development 
projects is driven both by China’s need for raw 
materials to fuel its domestic growth, and by 
the quest to build up China’s own multinational 
firms in new markets. SOEs have been involved 
in both labour-intensive manufacturing and 
infrastructure construction in developing 
countries, often through joint ventures with 
local private and state-owned enterprises, and 
have become highly influential in developing 
countries. However, beyond multinational 
SOEs, a growing wave of Chinese private firms 
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
are moving abroad. These SMEs are driven by 
growing domestic competition to seek new 
market opportunities overseas, but they do so 
with little coordination and direction from the 
state, and are often underprepared in operating 
in foreign and new environments.
The increasing role of market-driven 
businesses and SOEs in Chinese aid project 
implementation indicates an important 
transition away from state-dominated 
foreign aid. Business and economic interests 
have featured prominently at the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summits. 
However, motivations of the business sector 
may not always align with the Chinese 
government’s foreign policy goals motivating 
aid allocation, indicating potential gaps 
between Chinese aid policy and practice. 
Growing wave of Chinese SMEs in Africa
A new dynamic presence is spreading rapidly and widely across Africa: that of Chinese 
private enterprises. For these firms, Africa is ‘the last golden land’ of economic opportunity. 
Why are these enterprises investing in Africa? What are their perspectives on Africa’s 
investment climate? A growing number of firms are contradicting the stereotype of 
Chinese firms in Africa. Pushed by intense competition within China’s domestic marketplace 
and pulled by the glint of new opportunities, many small, private manufacturing firms 
are heading to Africa quite independently of the Chinese government. They grasp this 
opportunity in a ‘three jump’ pattern. The first two of these ‘three jumps’ are better 
known, from doing business within China to exporting to Africa; and then from exporting 
to Africa to investing in production in Africa. The third jump is less familiar: to investing 
in industry parks in Africa. Chinese firms cluster in new business parks, collaborating in 
coordinated production. Yet simultaneously, and contrary to popular perceptions, they are 
most concerned about the competition they face from other Chinese firms and not by 
competition from African or other expatriate firms in Africa. 
Estimates of the number of Chinese enterprises in Africa vary considerably. In 2006, the 
Chinese Exim Bank estimated that there were about 800 Chinese companies operating in 
Africa. According to this data, approximately 85 per cent were privately owned. However, 
evidence from Chinese embassies and the Chinese business communities in Africa indicates 
that China now has over 3,000 enterprises in Africa. According to one senior Chinese 
official: ‘To be honest, we don’t know how many firms, especially private firms, invest 
overseas. There are only limited number of companies registered with us [in our Province]. 
In fact, I believe that there are more firms. I hope they come to register with us’.
The Chinese business sector in Africa thus has growing ‘enclave’ characteristics: enterprises 
are located together in business parks, and simultaneously both competing with one 
another and cooperating and largely doing business with one another in the supply chain. 
They are relatively optimistic about the investment climate in Africa, especially those 
obstacles created by governments and public policy. However, Africa’s prospects for 
successfully harnessing the Chinese private firms to its development goals lies in the way 
each is adapting to their growing understanding of each other.
“‘Mutual benefit’ is 
a core principle in 
China’s aid and 
foreign policy, 
through which it 
helps build up the 
partner country’s 
capacity for 
independent ‘self-
development’.”
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Policy implications
• China is now frequently referred to as the emerging superpower of the twenty-
first century. On the basis of sustained and substantial economic growth over 
quarter of a century, China’s national power and regional and global standing has 
been transformed. As an increasingly significant global player, the second largest 
economy with burgeoning foreign exchange reserves, and possibly the largest 
contributor to global warming, increasingly scholars are focused on the implications 
of what its ‘peaceful rise’ means for the international competitiveness of other 
countries’ manufactures; for financial and exchange rate stability; for military 
security; and for global public goods and international development cooperation.
• China’s approach to aid significantly differs from that of Western donors 
and is still evolving, and awareness of differences in ideologies behind aid and 
development remains key to future successful aid cooperation. China does not 
wish to be regarded as a donor; its conceptions of its development cooperation 
and rejection of a donor identity must be respected when building engagement 
and cooperation bilaterally or in global forums. 
• Though non-interference is a central principle of China’s foreign aid policies, its 
growing involvement and investments in high-risk parts of sub-Saharan Africa mean 
this may be increasingly difficult to sustain. Increased political engagement and 
investment in security may be a necessary spillover in China’s engagement in Africa.
• The institutional context of China’s development cooperation is complex, and 
Western donors and external partners must take these differentiated political roles 
into consideration in order to effectively pursue trilateral development cooperation. 
The Chinese state and the DAFC in particular still has very limited capacity in 
coordinating between the multitude of actors operating in this environment. As 
China’s development assistance commitments grow, the institutional capacity and 
responsibility of this nascent agency will also need to be developed.
• Prospects for trilateral cooperation remain viable, particularly in forums like 
the G20 which has adopted shared growth and development as a part of its 
core agenda. China has also taken steps toward avenues for cooperation, and 
the creation of EBIEC, a division under the DAFC to manage international 
cooperation, shows it is willing to learn from, and amenable to cooperation with, 
traditional donors. However, in initiating trilateral cooperation, recipient countries 
must be central in leading and participating in discussions around trilateral 
cooperation between Western countries and China.
• The business sector and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are an increasingly 
salient presence in China’s development cooperation, in Africa and elsewhere. 
The growing diversity and multitude of Chinese firms now operating in Africa 
presents a challenge for state coordination, and in mediating China’s sometimes 
controversial public image abroad. Though incentivised by the state, business 
actors also act autonomously from state directives, and this must be recognised 
when liaising with Chinese business or state actors. Conflicts between state aims 
and business goals may be an emerging tension as China’s development activities 
evolve, leading to a potential gap between policy and practice.
